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1 Introduction
Most of the models of spatial discrimination with quantity competition exhibit a
unique agglomerated equilibrium when the market space is linear and bounded.
This result crucially depends on a restriction on the admissible levels of the unit
transportation cost - restriction which is indeed imposed by many authors, in
order to ensure that for any location pairs both firms deliver positive quanti-
ties over the whole market (Hamilton et al 1989, Anderson and Neven, 1991).
However, agglomeration implies full symmetry of firms’ behaviour at all market
addresses, thus making the spatial dimension eventually irrelevant at equilib-
rium. Moreover, within the above framework, and under the same restriction
on costs, Shimizu (2002) has shown that the agglomeration result is robust to
the introduction of an element of product diﬀerentiation, and therefore that the
degree of substitutability/complementarity is immaterial in the definition of the
firms’ optimal locations.
This paper discusses the role of product diﬀerentiation when the range of
admissible values of the unit transport costs is extended to those consistent
with full market coverage by both firms at equilibrium. By allowing for higher
values of t, the existence of an additional dispersed solution with full coverage,
originally suggested by Hamilton et al, is confirmed in the case of substitute
goods for a range of the transportation costs, the width and bounds of which
are shown to depend on the degree of substitutability. Moreover, the paper
shows how the latter interacts with t in the definition of the optimal dispersed
locations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we modify the stan-
dard model of spatial discrimination with Cournot competition by introducing
the Deneckere (1983) inverse demand function in order to capture product dif-
ferentiation. The solution for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of
the game is then followed by a brief discussion of their properties and of the
role of product diﬀerentiation. Section 3 concludes.
2 The model
In a spatial market two firms (labeled 1 and 2) are assumed to decide their
location along a segment of length l (normalized to 1 in the sequel) and then to
engage in quantity competition at all sites. Consumers are uniformly distributed
along the segment, a consumer’s location being denoted by x ∈ [0, 1]. Let a be
the location of firm 1 and 1 − b the location of firm 2 (i.e. b is the distance
of firm 2 from the right endpoint of the segment), with a + b ≤ 1. When
firms 1 and 2 deliver their product to a location x, they bear a freight cost,
linear in distance, respectively denoted by t |a− x| and t |1− b− x|. We also
assume that each firm incurs a constant and equal to zero marginal and average
cost of production. The products of the two firms may be either substitutes
or complements, so that in each address x market demand is given by pi (x) =
1 − γqj (x) − qi (x) (with j 6= i), where γ ∈ [−1, 1] (with γ 6= 0) denotes
2
